Riaz, A. ), Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures). The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80:3 (2010): 497-522. DePaul, M. Ugly Analysis and Value in A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. That said, for manipulationists who are not already inclined to accept the entailment from all-knowing to omni-understanding, the efficacy against the manipulationist is diffused as the example does not get off the ground. Discussion of pros and cons Evaluates the epistemological shift, in the present or in the future, indicating whether the shift is good or bad. Contrast thiscall it the intervening reading of the casewith Pritchards corresponding environmental reading of the case, where we are to imagine that the agent is reading a reliable academic book which is the source of many true beliefs she acquires about the Comanche. An in-depth exploration of different types of epistemic luck. New York: Free Press, 1965. Know How. (For example, is it a kind of knowledge, another kind of propositional attitude, an ability, and so on? Proposes a framework for reducing objectual understanding to what he calls explanatory understanding. Fourthly, a relatively fertile area for further research concerns the semantics of understanding attribution. Knowledge is almost universally taken to be to be factive (compare, Hazlett 2010). On the other hand, there are explanationists, who argue that it is knowledge or evaluation of explanations that is doing the relevant work. Your paper should be 3-4 pages in length, not counting the Title page and Reference . He argues that intuitions that rule against lucky understanding can be explained away. One can split views on this question into roughly three positions that advocate varying strengths of a factivity constraint on objectual understanding. See Elgin (2004) for some further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her account. For example, while it is easy to imagine a person who knows a lot yet seems to understand very little, think of the student who merely memorizes a stack of facts from a textbook; it is considerably harder to imagine someone who understands plenty yet knows hardly anything at all. Pritchard, D. Knowledge and Understanding in A. Fairweather (ed. Or, should we adopt a more relaxed view of what would be required to satisfy this conditionnamely, a view that focuses on the way the agent connects information. Discusses the connection between curiosity and true belief. Grimm (2012) has wondered whether this view might get things explanatorily backwards. by | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director Argues that the concerns plaguing theories of knowledge do not cause problems for a theory of understanding. Achievements are thought of as being intrinsically good, though the existence of evil achievements (for example, skillfully committing genocide) and trivial achievements (for example, competently counting the blades of grass on a lawn) shows that we are thinking of successes that have distinctive value as achievements (Pritchard 2010: 30) rather than successes that have all-things-considered value. For that reason, these will be addressed before moving on to the more explicitly epistemological concerns. However, advocates of moderate approaches to the factivity of understanding are left with some difficult questions to answer. Usually philosophical problems are overcome not by their resolution but rather by redefinition. This skeptical argument is worth engaging with, presumably with the goal of showing that understanding does not turn out to be internally indistinguishable from mere intelligibility. To the extent that these worries with transparency are apt, a potential obstacle emerges for the prospects of accounting for the value of understanding in terms of its transparency. Firstly, Wilkenfelds context-sensitive approach is in tension with a more plausible diagnosis of the example just considered: rather than to withhold attributing understanding in the case where the student is surrounded by experts, why notinsteadand in a way that is congruous with the earlier observation that understanding comes in degreesattribute understanding to the student surrounded by experts, but to a lesser degree (for example, Tim has some understanding of physics, while the professor has a much more complete understanding). (vi) an ability to give q (the right explanation) when given the information p. This aside, can we consider extending Grimms conception of understanding as non-propositional knowledge of causes to the domain of objectual understanding? Even so, and especially over the past decade, there has been agreement amongst most epistemologists working on epistemic value that that understanding is particularly valuable (though see Janvid 2012 for a rare dissenting voice). When considering interesting features that might set understanding apart from propositional knowledge, the idea of grasping something is often mentioned. Nevertheless, distinguishing between the two in this manner raises some problems for her view of objectual understanding, which should be unsurprising given the aforementioned counterexamples that can be constructed against a non-factive reading of Bakers construal of understanding-why. His alternative suggestion is to propose explanation as the ideal of understanding, a suggestion that has as a consequence that one should measure degrees of understanding according to how well one approximate[s] the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. Khalifa submits that this line is supported by the existence of a correct and reasonably good explanation in the background of all cases of understanding-why that does not involve knowledge of an explanationa background explanation that would, if known, provide a greater degree of understanding-why. DePaul, M. and Grimm, S. Review Essay: Kvanvigs The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 498-514. Strevens (2013) focuses on scientific understanding in his discussion of grasping. The cons of the epistemology shift that is a major concern to philosophers are the loss of, reading and communications since the student do not interact physically, these skills be instilled EPISTEMOLOGY SHIFT 5 by the teachers and through the help of physical environments. Therefore, the need to adopt a weak factivity constraint on objectual understandingat least on the basis of cases that feature idealizationslooks at least initially to be unmotivated in the absence of a more sophisticated view about the relationship between factivity, belief and acceptance (however, see Elgin 2004). It is also becoming an increasingly popular position to hold that understanding is more epistemically valuable than knowledge (see Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010). Examples of the sort considered suggest thateven if understanding has some important internalist component to ittransparency of the sort Zagzebski is suggesting when putting forward the KU claim, is an accidental property of only some cases of understanding and not essential to understanding. Unlike de Regt and Dieks (2005), Wilkenfeld aims to propose an inclusive manipulation-based view that allows agents to have objectual understanding even if they do not have a theory of the phenomenon in question. Grimm does not make the further claim that understanding is a kind of know-howhe merely says that there is similarity regarding the object, which does not guarantee that the activity of understanding and know-how are so closely related. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005. Intervening epistemic luck is the sort present in the Gettiers original cases (1963) which convinced most epistemologists to abandon the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975. and (ii) what qualifies a group of beliefs as a system in the sense that is at issue when it is claimed that understanding involves grasping relationships or connections within a system of beliefs? Epistemology is the study of sources of knowledge. Hills thinks that moral understanding, if it were any kind of propositional knowledge at all, would be knowing a proposition under a practical mode and not necessarily under a theoretical mode.. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. The topic of epistemic value has only relatively recently received sustained attention in mainstream epistemology. Elgin, C. Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 33-42. Furthermore, Section 3 considers whether characterizations of understanding that focus on explanation provide a better alternative to views that capitalize on the idea of manipulating representations, also giving due consideration to views that appear to stand outside this divide. Kelps account, then, explains our attributions of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such well-connected knowledge. The surgeons successful bypass is valued differently when one is made aware that it was by luck that he picked an appropriate blood vessel for the bypass. De Regt, H. and Dieks, D. A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. Synthese 144 (2005): 137-170. The conspiracy theorist possesses something which one who grasps (rather than grasps*) a correct theory also possesses, and yet one who fails to grasp* even the conspiracy theory (for example, a would-be conspiracy theorist who has yet to form a coherent picture of how the false propositions fit together) lacks. Firstly, achievement is often defined as success that is because of ability (see, for example, Greco 2007), where the most sensible interpretation of this claim is to see the because as signifying a casual-explanatory relationshipthis is, at least, the dominant view. To borrow a case from Riggs, stealing an Olympic medal or otherwise cheating to attain it lacks the kind of value one associates with earning the medal, through ones own skill. Contains a discussion of the fact that we often take ourselves to understand things we do not. Our culture is shifting, Dede argues, not just from valuing the opinions of experts to the participatory culture of YouTube or Facebook, but from understanding knowledge as fixed and linear to a . Finally, Section 6 proposes various potential avenues for future research, with an eye towards anticipating how considerations relating to understanding might shed light on a range of live debates elsewhere in epistemology and in philosophy more generally. Contains the famous counterexamples to the Justified True Belief account of knowledge. In particular, one might be tempted to suggest that some of the objections raised to Grimms non-propositional knowledge-of-causes model could be recast as objections to Khalifas own explanation-based view. In terms of parallels with the understanding debate, it is important to note that the knowledge of causes formula is not limited to the traditional propositional reading. He considers that grasping might be a modal sense or ability that allows the understander to, over and above registering how things are. According to his positive proposal, objectual understanding is the goal and what typically sates the appetite associated with curiosity. epistemological shift pros and cons. According to Elgin, a factive conception of understanding neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. This line merits discussion not least because the idea that understanding-why comes by degrees is often ignored in favor of discussing the more obvious point that understanding a subject matter clearly comes by degrees. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. In the first version, we are to imagine that the agent gets her beliefs from a faux-academic book filled with mere rumors that turn out to be luckily true. epistemological shift pros and cons. A restatement of Grimms view might accordingly be: understanding is knowledge of dependence relations. Morris suggests that the writer of the Comanche book might lack understanding due to failing to endorse the relevant propositions, while the reader might have understanding because she does endorse the relevant proposition. To the extent that this is correct, there is some cause for reservation about measuring degrees of understanding according to how well they approximate the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. A proponent of Khalifas position might, however, view the preceding response as question-begging. This type of understanding is ascribed in sentences that take the form I understand why X (for example, I understand why the house burnt down). Uses the hypothesis of extended cognition to argue that understanding can be located (at least partly) outside the head. Longworth, G. Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge. Nous 42 (2008): 50-79. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. What is it to have this ability to modify some mental representation? Her key thought here is that grasping the truth can actually impede the chances of ones attaining understanding because such a grasp might come at too high a cognitive cost. He argues that what is grasped or seen when one attains a priori knowledge is not a proposition but a certain modal relationship between properties, objects or identities. Riggs, W. Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding In M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds. For one thing, she admits that these abilities can be possessed by degrees. Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution A discussion of whether linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge. Although a range of epistemologists highlighting some of the important features of understanding-why and objectual understanding have been discussed, there are many interesting topics that warrant further research. As such, Khalifa is not attempting to provide an analysis of grasping. It is worth considering how and in what way a plausible grasping condition on understanding should be held to something like a factivity or accuracy constraint. Looks at understandings role in recent debates about epistemic value and contains key arguments against Elgins non-factive view of understanding. Suppose further that the agent could have easily ended up with a made-up and incorrect explanation because (unbeknownst to the agent) everyone in the vicinity of the genuine fire officer who is consulted is dressed up as fire officers and would have given the wrong story (whilst failing to disclose that they were merely in costume). Taking curiosity to be of epistemic significance is not a new idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Kelp (2015) makes a helpful distinction between two broad camps here. She claims, it may be possible to know without knowing one knows, but it is impossible to understand without understanding one understands (2001: 246) and suggests that this property of understanding might insulate it from skepticism. Of course, though, just as Lackey (2007) raises creationist teacher style cases against knowledge transmission principles, one might as well raise a parallel kind of creationist teacher case against the thesis that one cannot attain understanding from a source who herself lacks it. Looks at the increasing dissatisfaction with ever-more complicated attempts to generate a theory of knowledge immune to counterexamples. The Problem of the External World 2. As Wilkenfeld sees it, understanding should be construed as representational manipulability, which is to say that understanding is, essentially, the possessing of some representation that can be manipulated in useful ways. It seems as though understanding would possibly be undermined in a case where someone relying on the ideal gas law failed to appreciate it as an idealization. The idea of grasping* is useful insofar as it makes clearer the cognitive feat involved in intelligibility, which is similar to understanding in the sense that it implies a grasping of order, pattern and connection between propositions (Riggs, 2004), but it does not require those propositions to be true. In this respect, it seems Kelps move against the manipulationist might get off the ground only if certain premises are in play which manipulationists as such would themselves be inclined to resist. Proposes an account of understandings value that is related to its connection with curiosity. Another seemingly promising lineone that engages with the relation question discussed aboveviews grasping as intimately connected with a certain set of abilities. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Explores the pros and cons with at least 2 credible sources. This in part for three principal reasons. Early defence of explanations key role in understanding. The modern epistemology deals with the debate between rationalism and empiricism. For if the view is correct, then an explanation for why ones understanding why the painting is beautiful is richer, when it is, will simply be in terms of ones possession of a correct answer to the question of why it is beautiful. This is of course an unpalatable result, as we regularly attribute understanding in the presence of not just one, but often many, false beliefs. It should be noted that Hills 2009: 7 is also sympathetic to a similar thought, suggesting that the threshold for understanding might be contextually determined. A second reason that adverting to grasping-talk in the service of characterizing understanding raises further question is that it is often not clarified just what relationships or connections are being grasped, when they are grasped in a way that is distinctive of understanding. A. and Pritchard, D. Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck. Nos (2013). He claims that while we would generally expect her to have knowledge of her relevant beliefs, this is not essential for her understanding and as a result it would not matter if these true beliefs had been Gettierised (and were therefore merely accidentally true). Objectual understanding is equivalent to what Pritchard has at some points termed holistic understanding (2009: 12). Carter, J. Hills thinks that mere propositional knowledge does not essentially involve any of these abilities even if (as per the point above) propositional knowledge requires other kinds of abilities. This type of a view is a revisionist theory of epistemic value (see, for example, Pritchard 2010), which suggests that one would be warranted in turning more attention to an epistemic state other than propositional knowledgespecifically, according to Pritchardunderstanding. Kim, J. So, understanding is compatible with a kind of epistemic luck that knowledge excludes. As Kvanvig sees it, knowing requires non-accidental links between (internal) mental states and external events in just the right way. and Pritchard, D. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 41(1) (2014): 63-109. This leaves us, however, with an interesting question about the point at which there is no understanding at all, rather than merely weaker or poorer understanding. But it is not strictly true. (iii) an ability to draw from the information that q the conclusion that p (or that probably p). It is helpful to consider an example. Hempel, C. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Kelp, C. Understanding Phenomena. Synthese (2015). With these three types of understanding in mindpropositional understanding, understanding-why and objectual understandingthe next section considers some of the key questions that arise when one attempts to think about when, and under what conditions, understanding should be ascribed to epistemic agents. For example, we might require that the agent make sense of X in a way that is reasonablefew would think that the psychic above is reasonable, though it is beyond the scope of the current discussion to stray into exploring accounts of reasonableness. Finally, there is fruitful work to do concerning the relationship between understanding and wisdom. Putting this all together, a scientist who embraces the ideal gas law, as an idealization, would not necessarily have any relevant false beliefs. Greco, J. However, it is not entirely clear that extant views on understanding fall so squarely into these two camps. Contains Kims classic discussion of species of dependence (for example, mereological dependence). One issue worth bringing into sharper focus is whether knowing a good and correct explanation is really the ideal form of understanding-why. Includes further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her view of understanding. According to Zagzebski (2001), the epistemic value of understanding is tied not to elements of its factivity, but rather to its transparency. In other words, even though there is no such gas as that referred to in the law, accepting the law need not involve believing the law to be true and thus believing there to be some gas with properties that it lacks. A second variety of understanding that has generated interest amongst epistemologists is, understanding-why. ), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Open Document. as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). Outlines and evaluates the anti-intellectualist and intellectualist views of know-how. Attempts to explain away the intuitions suggesting that lucky understanding is incompatible with epistemic luck. (2007: 37), COPERNICUS: A central tenet of Copernicuss theory is the contention that the Earth travels around the sun in a circular orbit. Many seem to blend manipulationism with explanations, suggesting for example that what is required for understanding is an ability associated with mentally manipulating explanations. (For example, propositions, systems, bodies of information, the relationships thereof, and so on?). It focuses on means of human knowledge acquisition and how to differentiate the truth knowledge claims from the false one. A potential worry then is that the achievement one attains when one understands chemistry need not involve the subject working the subject matterin this case, chemistryscause. By contrast, Pritchard believes that understanding always involves strong cognitive achievement, that is, an achievement that necessarily involves either a significant exercise of skill or the overcoming of a significant obstacle. In a given context, then, one understands some subject matter P only if one approximates fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of P closely enough that one is sufficiently likely to successfully perform any task relating to P that is determined by the context, assuming that one has the skills needed to do so and to exercise them in suitably favorable conditions. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. An overview of issues relating to epistemic value, including discussion of understanding as a higher epistemic state. Whitcomb, D. Epistemic Value In A. Cullison (ed. Pritchard, D. The Value of Knowledge: Understanding. In A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. Specifically, Hills outlines six different abilities that she takes to be involved in grasping the reasons why pabilities which effectively constitute, on her view, six necessary conditions for understanding why p. These six abilities allow one to be able to treat q as the reason why p, not merely believe or know that q is the reason why p. They are as follows: (i) an ability to follow another persons explanation of why p. (ii) an ability to explain p in ones own words. ), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Morris challenges the assumption that hearers cannot gain understanding through the testimony of those who lack understanding, and accordingly, embraces a kind of understanding transmission principle that parallels the kind of knowledge transmission principle that is presently a topic of controversy in the epistemology of testimony. Consequently, engaging with the project of clarifying and exploring the epistemic states or states attributed when we attribute understanding is a complex matter. What is Justified Belief? In G. S. Pappas (ed. Such cases she claims feature intervening luck that is compatible with understanding. If this is right, then at least one prominent case used to illustrate a luck-based difference between knowledge and understanding does not hold up to scrutiny. The childs opinion displays some grasp of evolution. Grimm (2011) also advocates for a fairly straightforward manipulationist approach in earlier work. I side with positivism; which states knowledge can be found via empirical observations (obtained through the senses). For example, we might suppose an agent has a maximally complete explanation of how Michelangelos David came into existence between 1501 and 1504, what methods were used to craft it, what Michelangelos motivating reasons were at the time, how much clay was used, and so on. sustainability scholarship 2021; lost vape centaurus replacement panels; Section 3 examines the notion of grasping which often appears in discussions of understanding in epistemology. He claims further that this description of the case undermines the intuition that the writers lack of understanding entails the readers lack of understanding. Her main supporting example is of understanding the rate at which objects in a vacuum fall toward the earth (that is, 32 feet per second), a belief that ignores the gravitational attraction of everything except the earth and so is therefore not true. But, the chief requirement of understanding, for him, is instead that there be the right coherence-making relations in some agents collection of information (that is, that the agent has a grasp of how all this related information fits together. While we would apply a description of better understanding to agent A even if the major difference between her and agent B was that A had additional true beliefs, we would also describe A as having better understanding than B if the key difference was that A had fewer false beliefs. Many of these questions have gone largely unexplored in the literature. bella vista catholic charities housing; wills point tx funeral homes; ptvi triathlon distance; is frankie beverly in the hospital; birria tacos long branch; Make sure you cite them appropriately within your paper, and list them in APA format on your Reference page. A monograph that explores the nature and value of achievements in great depth. Epistemology is often defined as the theory of knowledge, and talk of propositional knowledge (that is, "S knows that p") has dominated the bulk of modern literature in epistemology. However, epistemologists have recently started to turn more attention to the epistemic state or states of understanding, asking questions about its nature, relationship to knowledge, connection with explanation, and potential status as a special type of cognitive achievement. Hills herself does not believe that understanding-why is some kind of propositional knowledge, but she points out that even if it is there is nonetheless good cause to think that understanding-why is very unlike ordinary propositional knowledge. Such a theory raises questions of its own, such as precisely what answering reliably, in the relevant sense, demands. For one thing, it is prudent to note up front that there are uses of understanding that, while important more generally in philosophy, fall outside the purview of mainstream epistemology. The following sections consider why understanding might have such additional value. Argues against compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. Discusses whether intellectualist arguments for reducing know-how to propositional knowledge might also apply to understanding-why (if it is a type of knowing how). Introduces intelligibility as an epistemic state similar to understanding but less valuable. Making such an epistemological shift can then open up the possibility of communication with other-than-human persons in ways that few educational researchers seem able (or willing) to acknowledge (see Harvey, 2003). Solicitar ms informacin: 310-2409701 | administracion@consultoresayc.co. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology. Meanwhile, he suggests that were you to ask a fake fire officer who appeared to you to be a real officer and just happened to give the correct answer, it is no longer plausible (by Pritchards lights) that you have understanding-why. There is little work focusing exclusively on the prospects of a non-factive construal of understanding-why; most authors, with a few exceptions, take it that understanding-why is obviously factive in a way that is broadly analogous to propositional knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Specifically, a very weak view of understandings factivity does not fit with the plausible and often expressed intuition that understanding is something especially epistemically valuable. By contrast, the paradigmatic case of environmental epistemic luck is the famous barn faade case (for example, Ginet 1975; Goldman 1979), a case where what an agent looks at is a genuine barn which unbeknownst to the individual is surrounded by faades which are indistinguishable to the agent from the genuine barn.
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